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The impact of scandal on public opinion
P
olitical scandal is a rare subject of academic analysis, maybe because it
lies on the fringes of human and systemic weakness. It is difficult to
say whether this phenomenon should be studied by psychologists, sociol-
ogists, political scientists or even experts on social communication. This
issue is downplayed, which is unjustified because – although it is true that
scandals frequently stem from highly trivial sources (the most frequent
ones include sex, money, the pursuit of power or abuse of authority) – the
consequences of disclosing certain facts can be harmful for entire political
systems. Scandals sweep presidents, prime ministers and ministers off the
stage, destroy political careers, break ruling coalitions and bring about
consequential crises of social confidence in authorities. Events involving
public persons, in particular politicians, which are stigmatised as being
scandalous, are a blow to the social capital of the authorities. Their signifi-
cance is frequently underestimated as regards democratic procedures. For
public opinion, individuals implicated in scandals are the living proof of
the inconsistency of their apparent attachment to the ethical principles,
which they declare especially during election campaigns, and their actual
breaching.
The term scandal “refers to actions or events involving certain kinds of
transgressions which become known to others and are sufficiently serious
to elicit a public response” (Thompson, 2010, p. 28). Therefore, scandal
does not emerge without transgression, but the size of this transgression
needs to fall within certain brackets. If it is minor, it does not have to result
in a scandal, but when it is enormous, it goes beyond a mere scandal. Nei-
ther a speeding ticket nor a murder committed by a politician do not con-
stitute a scandal, as they do not fall within the standards that can be
breached to be qualified as scandalous, rather than as a misdemeanour in
the former case and a crime in the latter. Consequently, if a scandal means
breaching standards, it is defined in terms of culture, time and space, the
same way these standards are. The same activities do not have to breach
standards for everybody, everywhere at any time. Some kinds of scandal
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can only emerge in certain conditions, therefore we can even speak about
the culture of scandal (Kepplinger, 2008, p. 15).
John B. Thompson is right to note that the initial breaching of a stan-
dard is frequently less significant than infringing on secondary standards,
while seeking to conceal that initial breach (Thompson, 2010, p. 32). This
can be exemplified by the Watergate scandal, where the fate of President
Richard Nixon was to a greater extent influenced by the attempts to cover
up his connections with the individuals who broke into the Democrats’ of-
fices than the break-in itself. The publication of tapes recorded in the Oval
Office was of paramount importance, as they revealed to American public
opinion certain personality traits of Nixon which did not fit with the image
of a President. The reaction of German ex-President Woolf to the disclo-
sure of what benefits he enjoyed in violation of ethical principles falls into
the same category. It appears that his negative assessment was consider-
ably more influenced by his attempts to prevent the publication of incrimi-
nating articles and the abuse of power for this purpose. Finally, we have
the Polish example of the ‘tapegate’of 2014, when the content of the tapes
was at least for some time overshadowed by the campaign the prosecution
and the Internal Security Agency (ABW) launched to retrieve from the
journalists of Wprost the full audio recordings of the politicians’ incrimi-
nating conversations.
Experts on public image recommend that politicians involved in
a scandal admit their mistake and ask for forgiveness up to the point of res-
ignation from office. Paradoxically, this gives them the chance of salvag-
ing some honour and potentially even returning to politics after a period in
the wilderness, by contrast, lying or obfuscation can utterly destroy their
reputation. The renowned American social psychologist, Robert Cialdini,
claims that voters never love their politicians more than when the latter ad-
mit their mistakes, so it is worth admitting even those sins they did not ac-
tually commit. However, politicians frequently adapt a different strategy,
named the maximax strategy by decision theory, whereby in trying to save
everything they lose everything. Attacked from every side, the heroes of
scandals often begin to act aggressively towards the media. They rarely
benefit from this, and usually set a mechanism of negative feedback in
motion, tarnishing their image in the eyes of public opinion even more.
The power of the media to create this image is incomparable with that of
those involved in an affair, something the culprits often seem to forget.
Pubic opinion has its own crucial part to play in this performance; to
some extent it is as important as the person violating the standard. The vio-
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lation is not a scandal in itself. A public scandal breaks out only when the
audience is activated. Scandals have a backstage and a director, who de-
cides whether to release information to the public and when to do it. News
of the infringement of a standard released at the appropriate moment can
provide a powerful political weapon. The reactions of people who are not
actually involved in the scandal not only serve the purpose of describing
the events, but are an integral part of the scandal. No reaction means no
scandal, which, by nature, makes scandals the object of interest of public
opinion studies, as public opinion is only concerned with controversial
issues. Controversiality is a defining element of public opinion, and it
concentrates around the issues that arouse different public sentiments.
Non-controversial matters do not become the concern of public opinion
as, among other things, they do not attract attention of the audience and do
not stir emotions. Whether this happens or not, to a great extent, depends
on the mass media, which shape the image of an event, presenting its
controversiality, for instance, by referring to different opinions on a given
matter, thereby framing it in the category of conflict. Sometimes an event
is such a clear example of a breach of standards that presenting two oppos-
ing opinions is difficult, but then coverage is dominated by the drastic fea-
tures of the message. The media can make a minor, or only locally
significant, transgression a primary subject for public opinion. The weight
of scandal does not depend on the weight of the standard, but on how use-
ful the scandal is for the media in terms of positioning and framing. Hans
Mathias Kepplinger observed that scandals are always accompanied by
a wave of media coverage which gives the impression that a given anom-
aly is a significant problem, stigmatising the perpetrators in an almost
unanimous manner. Media coverage always generates social outrage,
whose intensity reflects the intensity of the coverage, making the perpetra-
tors feel that they are victims of a campaign waged against them, even if
they do not deny the accusations (Kepplinger, 2008, p. 7). The power of
the media lies in their ability to employ different ways to present the trans-
gressions revealed. The size of the scandal is determined not necessarily
by the range of wrongness, but by how intensively it is scandalised in the
media coverage. Scandalisation is performed by means of different instru-
ments: language (stylistic instruments, evaluative vocabulary), photo-
graphs, filmed material, selected comments and so on. As early as 1963,
Bernard Cohen wrote that “the press is much more than a provider of in-
formation and entertainment. The press may not be successful in telling
people what to think, but it is stunningly successful in telling its readers
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what to think about” (Cohen, 1963, p. 13). In his analysis of framing, Rob-
ert Entman observes that to frame is “to select some aspects of a perceived
reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way
as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral
evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation” (Entman, 1993). He distin-
guishes the five most popular means used by the media to frame the events
they cover, clearly indicating that one of the main purposes of framing is
to arouse controversy within the frame of a given interpretation. An event
framed as a conflict generates the obvious controversiality of the issue,
which follows from the nature of conflict as such. Being a personal drama,
the event is personalised, thus acquiring additional emotion. Presentation
of the event in terms of a scandal easily stimulates compassion for the vic-
tims or anger with those involved.1 When the event is framed as a certain
consequence, produced in different planes of social life, it inspires a desire
to hold those responsible for the negative events accountable. The assess-
ment of these events can differ, of course. When an event is presented as
a moral issue, it can easily call for the sin to be stigmatised, for the perpe-
trators to be punished, thereby demonstrating one’s own purity. The media
can also present the event as someone’s fault, enabling the perpetrators to
be sought.2
It is worth noting that scandal does not usually commence with the
transgression of a standard but rather with the act of its disclosure and the
accusations that transform the original transgression into the knowledge
that public opinion acquires. Scandal can be deemed to be a delayed reac-
tion to the transgression of the standard. This temporal shift is determined
by the media. It objectively depends on when the information is obtained
and subjectively – on when the time to disclose it is deemed to be particu-
larly advantageous (mainly for political reasons). The period prior to the
disclosure can allow gossip and rumours to circulate. In political circles,
transgressing moral standards (related to sex, alcohol and so on) is fre-
quently common knowledge among the elite and does not have to generate
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1 From this point of view the conduct of those male politicians’ betrayed wives,
who did not allow the media to frame a scandal through the perspective of their per-
sonal drama, e.g. Hillary Clinton and Wanda £y¿wiñska, should be appreciated.
2 Wiliam Gamson identifies a number of other frames, including that of risk and
threat, violence, victims, the strong and the weak, control and consensus, competition,
horse race, strategic, game, personality, issue, episode and cold war (Gamson, Mo-
digliani, 1989, p. 1–37, after: Palczewski, 2011).
scandal, thus confirming the cultural relativity of transgression. The elite
are, by nature, convinced that they have greater rights than the masses,
and of their being allowed to transgress the standards that bind ‘ordinary
people’. When the fact of such a transgression becomes public, however,
and the scandal emerges (the knowledge spreads outside the group)
members of the elite have to react as if they did not know about the trans-
gression and they were clearly appalled the same way the broad public
opinion is.
Political scandals appear to be of particular importance for society and
for the forming of public opinion. Thompson refers to the views of Andrei
Markovits and Mark Silverstein who indicate that the main distinguishing
feature of political scandal is seeking to increase one’s power at the cost of
the principles of proper conduct (Thompson, 2010, p. 119). The two schol-
ars believe that political and financial scandals involving politicians are
not political if they are not related to a certain abuse of power perpetrated
at the cost of the principles of proper conduct and procedures. Only liberal
democracy is characterised by preventing such practices, therefore politi-
cal scandals can only break out in this political system. The disclosure of
a scandal in totalitarian systems is impossible due to how the media oper-
ate there; and it requires exceptional courage from journalists in authori-
tarian systems. Scandals obviously emerge also in these systems but their
frequency (the frequency with which transgressions of standards are dis-
closed in the context of the abuse of power) is significantly lower.
Markovits and Silverstein’s attitude appears somewhat paradoxical, but it
is so only if we look at other sources of information than the media, which
is, of course, possible, as we know from history, but unlikely.
In the opinion of John B. Thompson, the significance of political scan-
dals in a liberal democracy follows from the fact that they reduce the sym-
bolic capital which is a condition for political power to be exercised. This
can also undermine the foundations of political power as such, because it
destroys (or threatens to destroy) the key assets which politicians to a cer-
tain extent rely on. These assets involve their reputation and good name as
well as the respect other politicians and the public media pay to them
(Thompson, 2010, p. 132). This observation borders on idealisation, but
being sceptical in this area may be a product of individual experience of
living in a concrete state. The confidence in politicians is very low in Po-
land, and practice shows that scandals are not very harmful to them.
Thompson believes, however, that weakened symbolic capital reduces
one’s potential to exert influence on his environment. It would be a consid-
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erable mistake, then, to treat scandal as a superficial phenomenon or a dis-
traction from the actual subject of politics.
Despite Markovits’and Silverstein’s reservations, three types of politi-
cal scandals are usually indicated: those related to sexual matters, finance
and exercise of power. These are ideal categories, of course, as how to
classify a scandal related to a politician’s addiction to alcohol or drugs, or
involvement in domestic violence. Possibly sexuality should be replaced
with morals as a criterion of scandal. The division of scandals according to
their sources, however, is not of particular importance for this paper, al-
though it is true that erotic scandals involving politicians sell best, as they
combine two exciting fields of life: sex and power. It might be more effi-
cient to divide scandals using the criterion of the standard-violating desire
to satisfy the need for power – hyper-dominance, hyper-gratification and
hyper-acceptance (the latter would also encompass the sexual area). In the
opinion of Alfred Adler, the need for power, fame or wealth felt at a hyper
level (not to be confused with the quite natural expectations every individ-
ual has in these terms) must produce frustration with the inability to
achieve complete and perpetual satisfaction in these areas (Adler, 1946).
Such frustration can easily transform into activities that violate the stan-
dards which are typically a common product of individuals complying
with standards.
It can be easily observed that in the field of politics one can identify
scandals resulting in the destruction of the political image on the one hand,
and on the other, scandals that are to a certain extent simulated in order to
make the perpetrator’s image more attractive, or at least attract the atten-
tion of public opinion through the media. Politicians have long realised
the advantageous influence of scandalisation on the interest of the mass
media. Therefore, scandals can be divided in respect of the intentional or
unintentional outcome they produce. Not every scandal can serve the pur-
pose of image building, of course. Scandals involving corruption are not
likely to serve this purpose. Sexual or, more broadly speaking, moral scan-
dals, however, can be an efficient tool to make image more attractive, de-
pending on the culture (not only political culture). The political image of
Italian Prime Minister, Silvio Berlusconi, has long benefited from his nu-
merous scandals, until the moral standards of Italy were breached. Silvio
Berlusconi’s scandalising image creation was obviously aided by the na-
tional traits attributed to Italians, as well as by the fact of his being a media
mogul. It is, after all, worth keeping permanent control over the framing of
the scandalous event. This is not an indispensable condition, however, as
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exemplified by Russia, where Vladimir Zhirinovsky often uses moral
scandals to build his image, and Poland, where Janusz Palikot makes
a successful use of this mechanism, albeit being criticised by the media.
Paradoxically, in the case of scandals intended to create image, the media
are treated instrumentally, although sometimes the inspirers lose control
over them, as in the case of Polish ex-Prime Minister Kazimierz Mar-
cinkiewicz.
It is difficult to speak about the academically founded theory of scan-
dal, although an attempt by John B. Thompson should be respectfully re-
ferred to here; he tried to develop a social theory of scandal that would link
scandal with the undermining of reputation which is, in his opinion, the
main source of symbolic power. He reconstructs other theoretical ap-
proaches outlining four in particular (Thompson, 2010, p. 294–308).
Firstly, scandal can be approached as an ephemeral event exerting neg-
ligible influence on the operation of the social system (the theory of the
lack of consequences). Scandals are an element of modern pop-culture,
with all its superficiality and short-term life. Scandals in general, and po-
litical scandals in particular, provide entertainment without consequence;
they are the product of a media culture which has transformed the sensa-
tional disclosure of public persons’ private lives into a self-sustaining
form of journalism. This claim is confirmed by the transience of scandals.
Old ones are replaced by new ones, which seems to indicate that they are
not significant if they disappear so easily. Scandals are not always clearly
accounted for, which makes them seem trivial events blown out of propor-
tion by the media. Before one scandal is explained, it gets replaced by an-
other one, whose actual course, reasons and outcomes we may also have
no time to learn.
Secondly, there is the functionalist concept of scandal which claims
that scandals serve to confirm the standards and conventions that are
breached by the activities in question. Thompson derives this view from
Emil Durkheim’s concept of religion, indicating that, in the modern media
world, scandal can be deemed as a secularised form of sin, which is indis-
pensable for society to face their own vices and experience them in the
process of disclosure, condemnation and punishment. Confidence in the
social order is thereby confirmed by means of a public demonstration of
this order’s ability and determination to combat sin. We need sinners’
breaching standards to be revealed to feel better about ourselves, as those
who do not commit transgressions, or whose transgressions remain undis-
covered, since public opinion is not interested in our lives. Consequently,
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public persons, in particular politicians, deserve especially harsh judg-
ment. It is nice to feel that one is better than the transgressors, it is good to
find oneself on the ‘light side of the force’.
Thirdly, there is a concept that criticises the media, emphasising the
harmful influence scandal has on public discourse. The source of this con-
cept can be sought in the premises of the theory of mass society. The me-
dia, which are frequently interested in quite trivial conduct of public
persons, marginalise debates and issues of vastly greater significance.
This diminishes the level of debate and gives secondary importance to ra-
tional arguments. Jurgen Habermas may be recalled here, and his opinion
about the high quality of the autochthonous public realm of direct partici-
pation and glaring deterioration of the rationality of discourse in the public
media realm (Habermas, 2008). Scandals, especially moral scandals, re-
ported in a personalised and highly moralistic manner, provide ready con-
tent not only for a tabloidised press, but also for other media fighting for
their market share. By this token, they no longer act as the guardians of so-
cial values and become commentators, or even co-participants of the his-
torical collapse of the public realm. This approach to scandal is in line with
the overly optimistic outlook on the role of the press in the 18th century, for
example, as well as on the rationality of debate at that time. This by no
means changes the fact that the quantitatively limited public realm had to
be of a higher level than that of modern debate, that has adapted to the real-
ity of mass democracy. Every new medium plunges deeper down. This is
evidenced by the analysis of public debate after the spread of printed
press, radio, television and – now – the internet.
Fourthly, in contrast to the foregoing concept, scandal can be ap-
proached as an element that enriches public debate, approximating it to the
scope of the interests of ordinary people, who are interested in politics
only, or maybe mainly, as far as soft, preferably sensational, news is con-
cerned. The tabloids are focused on the events from the fringes of public
and private lives, forcing politicians to face up to issues they would rather
not talk about, or forget about altogether. It can also be said that, instead
of idealistic images of politicians, the media present realistic images of
people coping with everyday problems. Interestingly, while founded on
utterly different premises, the third and fourth concepts arrive at a descrip-
tion of the same phenomenon – infotainment. Incidentally, scandalisation
is becoming an effective way to create media audience, which is sold to
advertisers, which is especially significant for the mass media operating
on a free market.
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Refraining from an assessment of the outcome, one can consider the
reasons for this peculiar career of political scandal, indicating several es-
sential changes that have taken place over the last half a century in how the
social system has been functioning.
Firstly, scandal is the product of the increasing visibility of political
leaders, which is a result of the opportunities the media have acquired to
interfere in their lives and the distinctly reduced limitations on the publica-
tion of information. To a much greater extent than was the case several de-
cades ago, the field of politics has become the field of the media, where the
relations between politicians and ordinary citizens are shaped by media
forms of communication. The growing visibility of politicians increases
the likeliness of a scandal to be disclosed. All citizens may be equal before
the law, but not all transgressors of standards are equal in the face of scan-
dal. On account of their position, function or responsibility they have as-
sumed, some people are at greater risk of becoming the heroes of scandals
in case of any transgressions committed. Theoretically, the mass media,
which share the responsibility for the content and form of public debate
could avoid shocking the audiences with scandalous news, or at least not
focus on it so much. Yet the competitive circumstances of a media market
which is becoming increasingly tabloidised takes precedence over jour-
nalistic reliability.
Secondly, the opportunities for surveillance and supervision have in-
creased. Secret recording of conversations, shooting pictures from a distance,
interception of data, and the retrieval of encoded content transmitted elec-
tronically has created new ways to invade the privacy of people who are
especially interesting to public opinion, such as members of the political,
business, and artistic elite. Scandals are increasingly often produced by
journalistic provocation, which is caused by the relative ease of creating
audiovisual documentation. The technical potential foretold by films and
books from the second half of the 20th century has already become a fact.
What appeared technically or ethically impossible is the reality of the
modern media world. The ‘tapegate’ scandal in Poland demonstrated that
everybody can be taped, which is a scandal in itself, and that the content
and language of the private discussions of public people will always
arouse controversy.
Thirdly, the media market is characterised by fierce competition which
forces changes in journalistic standards. The advancements in technology
do not have to mean that they will be used for surveillance, unless they are
accompanied by changes in journalistic ethics. Investigative journalism
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has developed dynamically since the 1960s and 70s, but it was rooted in
a belief in the controlling function performed by the media. At present,
the controlling purpose is becoming secondary to the desire to supply sen-
sational, shocking, or scandalous material, and this is why the most
tabloidised media always spearhead the publication of such news or gos-
sip. Scandals disclosed by the more highbrow media (although not free
from tabloidisation themselves) usually lead to more serious consequences,
involving the transgression of secondary standards. It is worth observing
that the media remained highly discreet regarding the numerous love af-
fairs of President John F. Kennedy, unlike what happened thirty years later
in the case of President Bill Clinton, who demonstrated considerable re-
straint and modesty in his ignorance about oral sex.
Fourthly, political life requires that its leaders are vested with public
trust, otherwise any election of a politician would be an act of hypocrisy. On
the other hand, we attach increasingly greater importance to politicians’pri-
vate lives, assuming that the principles they observe in their private lives are
going to translate into how they exercise their public functions. While this
approach may be intuitively justified, it constitutes an element of the mech-
anism of optimistic memory, as we must realise that in the old days very lit-
tle was known about politicians’ private lives, therefore it could not have
influenced the assessment of their political standards. Scandal has become
democratic, in the wake of lowered criteria for elevating people to the elite
whose members are of interest to public opinion. Increasingly often it is the
ability to cause scandal that promotes people to the highly transient world of
fame, which explains the emergence of celebrities.
To conclude, it can be said that scandal has become such a powerful ele-
ment of public discourse, both in terms of politics and the media, that it is high
time academic criteria were applied to it along with the research methods that
are at our disposal at present. It is also time for us to domesticate scandal, the
same way sin was domesticated by Christianity. It seems unlikely that the
moral standards of our politicians will rise higher than the possibilities of dis-
closure and publication of their transgressions. And the interest of public
opinion in the ‘sins’ of popular people will only continue to grow.
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Wp³yw skandalu na opiniê publiczn¹
Streszczenie
Skandal polityczny rzadko pojawia siê jako przedmiot analizy naukowej, byæ
mo¿e dlatego, ¿e znajduje siê na pograniczu obszaru ludzkich u³omnoœci i s³aboœci
systemu. Nie wiadomo, czy powinni badaæ to zjawisko psycholodzy, socjolodzy, poli-
tolodzy, czy specjaliœci z zakresu komunikowania spo³ecznego. Wp³yw skandalu na
opiniê publiczn¹ jest jednak niezaprzeczalny tak samo jego konsekwencje dla funkcjo-
nowania systemu politycznego. Skandale zmiataj¹ ze sceny prezydentów, premierów,
ministrów, niszcz¹ kariery polityków, a tak¿e owocuj¹ brzemiennymi w skutki kryzy-
sami spo³ecznego zaufania do w³adzy. Wydarzenie z udzia³em osób publicznych,
przede wszystkim polityków, napiêtnowane jako skandal stanowi cios w kapita³
spo³eczny w³adzy. Jego znaczenie jest czêsto niedoceniane wobec rozstrzygniêæ pro-
ceduralnych demokracji. Osoby uwik³ane w skandal stanowi¹ dla opinii publicznej
¿ywy dowód niezgodnoœci deklarowanego – zw³aszcza w trakcie kampanii wybor-
czych – przywi¹zania do zasad etycznych i faktycznego ich ³amania. Artyku³ zawiera
rozwa¿ania na temat samej istoty skandalu, okreœlaj¹c go jako akt naruszenia normy,
ujawnienie tego naruszenia oraz reakcjê opinii publicznej. Scharakteryzowano w nim
tak¿e podstawowe koncepcje dotycz¹ce przyczyn rosn¹cej iloœci skandali oraz ich
konsekwencji dla spo³eczeñstwa.
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